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Posts Tagged ‘realism’

It’s a strange thing, being a hater. It becomes increasingly hard to distinguish one’s visceral reactions to pseudo-analytical drivel from reasoned disagreement. Such is the situation in which I found myself this morning when this came down the pipe.

BLUF: Friedman wishes the President best of luck in the West’s latest military intervention. Solid.

Here’s the catch. Friedman paints with such broad strokes that any historical nuance fades away under sweeping narratives that somehow allow a delineation between the ‘old’ Middle East up to, I dunno, 2010? and the ‘new’ Middle East that has after ”half a century suddenly, from the bottom up, decide[d] to join history.” To be fair, that paragraph deserves to be quoted in full:

When an entire region that has been living outside the biggest global trends of free politics and free markets for half a century suddenly, from the bottom up, decides to join history — and each one of these states has a different ethnic, tribal, sectarian and political orientation and a loose coalition of Western and Arab states with mixed motives trying to figure out how to help them — well, folks, you’re going to end up with some very strange-looking policy animals. And Libya is just the first of many hard choices we’re going to face in the “new” Middle East.

Really? All those weird entanglements of tribes and ethnicities and coalitions and political cultures are going to define our ‘hard choices’ now? What about that other stuff Friedman championed?

At any rate, now that we know how complex the region is as a whole — “fraught with moral and political ambiguities”, as it were – the outcome of the conflict in Libya is all the more significant. Indeed, now that external forces, led by the U.S., France, and Britain, continue to escalate their role in the country, it is essential that the specifics of this endeavor are not divorced from general issues at stake in Africa and the Middle East.

Notwithstanding strategic complexities and confounding regional/sub-regional/supra-regional dynamics, as well as the ‘problematic’ track record of Western intervention in the Orient, it has apparently become acceptable to reduce our conflicts to simple formulas and a dash of luck:

I hope Qaddafi’s regime collapses like a sand castle, that the Libyan opposition turns out to be decent and united and that they require just a bare minimum of international help to get on their feet. Then U.S. prestige will be enhanced and this humanitarian mission will have both saved lives and helped to lock another Arab state into the democratic camp.

Dear Lord, please make President Obama lucky.

I also wish for great things to come about with a “bare minimum” of effort. Usually, things don’t work out that way.

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I was pointed to Paul Collier’s latest Guardian column on the violent political standoff in Ivory Coast by the always entertaining Wronging Rights blog.  In the piece, Collier advocates for a military coup openly supported by regional and international powers.  Indeed, he supports the option to:

…generate a credible threat of force from the government’s own army. In much of Africa, the national army is the force most feared by presidents. Leaders go to considerable lengths to keep the army happy, but coups are still common. Because neither African governments nor the international community want to encourage coups, they have taken the line that the military should simply stay out of politics at all costs. This is understandable, but misguided: it’s better to set guidelines as to the very limited circumstances under which the ousting of an incumbent ruler would be legitimate.

The legitimacy of the incumbent remaining in power is not at question here, and the international community has spoken quite plainly on the matter.  The precedent that such an approach to transferring power could set, however, seems gratuitously risky in a political climate where legitimate rule and accountable militaries are already tenuous propositions.  Perhaps it is too cliché to make ‘Pandora’s Box’ -type arguments, but what Collier fails to elaborate upon is how exactly the terms of such “very limited circumstances” for legitimate military coups should come about, or what they would look like once agreed to by some yet-to-be determined process.

I’m reminded that Collier’s position is generally the one of the realist, having little time for political ideals when the management of economic forces is at stake.  Consequently, it is not a drastic step to advocate for legitimizing political coups as tools of regional and international order as circumstances require; such methods would be but means toward economic growth from which, in turn, democracy and human rights could eventually follow.  The order that these process are bound to take is clear.  It would be naïve to pretend that the incitement or encouragement of coups and insurrections have not found their place in the muddy waters of foreign relations.  Still, embracing such an approach in order to avoid the difficulties of external intervention — and at the likely cost of massive further internal destabilization — is highly problematic when placed in juxtaposition to notions of the rule of law…regardless of the legal standing of the existing order.

Oh dear, I’m afraid I might have just made a Kantian argument.

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So, another month of silence on this blog…  Anyway, I’ve got an hour before I need to run off to rugby practice, so let’s see what I can come up with.  Ah, I know…how about the paradox of American exceptionalism.  That should be an easy one.

This morning, I came across some interesting thoughts by Tom Ricks regarding the positions of the new #3 at the Pentagon.  Specifically, he quotes Flournoy’s rejection of invoking exceptionalism in national security policy.  Ricks has her argue that America’s strict defense of the rule of law must be paramount.  Torture policies must be rejected, international tribunals embraced, the global commons secured.  So far so good.

Here’s the problem: There are two sides to the exceptionalism coin.  We get the assertion that the country (or any sovereign country, for that matter) can, will, and must do everything, EVERYTHING, possible to secure its “interests”…this is the self-fulfilling prophesy of the neoconservative shotgun marriage of Realpolitik with dogmatic moral clarity.  But then there’s also the bit about America being uniquely positioned to be a global leader like none other.  These two notions get confused almost as a rule, and advocates of the former position most surely will be found representing themselves as the strongest (loudest?) advocate of the latter.  At the same time, there are tendencies to decry the “internationalism” of those that would plainly seek to institute a broader reaching means of global governance and accountability.  This has nothing, of course, to do with a new world order, global superstate, or remaking the United States in the mold of the European Union.  It does, however, have everything to do with imbuing the frameworks of international political and civil society with the legitimacy, tarnished yet fully salvageable, of the American brand.  Or, better yet, is there not something to be said for aligning American Law, policy, and practice with the most fundamental codifications of human dignity, in war and peace?

Michael Ignatieff has asked: To what degree does America play by the rules it itself has helped create?

Reagan’s answer would have been: Ratification of the Convention by the United States will clearly express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice unfortunately still prevalent in the world today.

Therein lies the irony of American exceptionalism.  Now, it’s time to stop making exceptions and be exceptional again.

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A tenet that will surely continue to be heard as the new administration establishes its image on the world stage is that compromises between ideals and security will no longer be tolerated.  The notion featured prominently in the President’s inaugural, and was most recently repeated by the Vice President in his speech to the Munich Security Conference.  Indeed, the public narrative of the administration would hold that security without ideals is as hollow as ideals without security.  Honest voices will argue for the primacy of one over the other, will passionately disagree over the means to achieve both, and will level charges of ill intent against their fellow citizen, yet for the sake of the nation’s just cause there must remain a fine shield around robust and passionate debate if it is to be protected from the baggage of faction.

Charges have recently been leveled at the new administration that are critical in the highest order, and must be considered in that light.  Central figures in the policy apparatus of the previous administration have gone so far as to say that actions taken in the first days of the Obama presidency to roll back interrogation and detainment policies threaten the security of the United States, and that the decisions represent adherence to rhetoric without regard to reality.  Yoo and Cheney hold firmly to the position that not only were their policies successful but also fundamentally necessary for national security.  No other alternatives, by their reasoning, are conscionable.  In pursuit of the comprehensive authority they deemed necessary to prosecute their campaign on their own terms, however, these strict constructionist types have failed to explain why Article VI of the Constitution does not actually apply, and why U.S. international commitments are binding only when convenient.  The quasi-legal opinions offered in defense of administration policies in those regards do not address these issues, instead falling back on claims to unbounded executive power.

The temptation to base assertions of power on the notion of just sovereignty is a dangerous one, for, as I regularly like to point out, that approach is morally insufficient (in fact, regardless of the legal justification).  On what grounds can we assert the rightness of our purpose if not on the principles that have informed our Constitution, the international institutions and frameworks that we ourselves enabled, and the treaties to which we are a part?  How is a foreign policy sustainable if it is wrapped in the cloak of war and conflict, defined by the otherness of the world?  To be absolutely clear, there is a difference between “Speak softly and carry a big stick” and flailing madly about with that stick.  The ability to tell the American story has been considerably challenged, I should say, by an over-reliance on absolute instruments of power, and all those with a stake in the American historical narrative in the world would do well to see new policies through to success.  The non-cooperative world stage should not be left to uncooperative self-fulfilling prophecies.

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A theme from which this journal can’t seem to get away is the wholesale embrace of the complex nuances of reality that has so far marked the composition of the next administration. The maniacal blathering from certain circles that a Democratic administration would surely mean the end of freedom as we know it, that socialism and the end of global primacy were just around the corner, has of course been shown to lack all substance. More importantly, what can be gleaned from the incoming team is a resounding rejection of politicized national security that sadly and pathetically became a trademark of the Bush White House. So, the theme we started with will continue today, underscored by developments that cast a spotlight on the likely future of the American defense and security establishment.

The Pentagon released DoD Directive 3000.07 this week, outlining high-level policy on Irregular Warfare, and further contextualizing 3000.05 Stability Operations. To the point, IW and Stability Operations are core responsibilities of American forces, depend for their success on partnership, engagement, and cooperation with organizations and institutions beyond traditional military channels, and will require for their execution unprecedented levels of systemic and political dedication. Less an issue of the military being over-extended and unable to carry out missions alone, this policy development recognizes the critical importance of cooperatively (and, I would say, holistically) addressing security, humanitarian, and political crises that cannot be forced into any one “box”. As the literature and citations around 3000.07 are sure to start piling up (and assuming a similarly inclined USDP to be announced in due course) it will be worth watching how effectively the establishment at large is able to implement broad unconventional policy.

The seriousness with which the highest echelons of the Pentagon will be dealing with such matters is reflected in Bob Gates’ magnificent essay in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs. The piece confirms the wisdom of retaining Gates and stacking the national security team with IR realists. Gates points a finger squarely in the face of those elements of the bureaucracy that would hinder the success of “everything else”, to steal from Barnett, and leaves precious little breathing room for neoconservative apparatchiks. One can only hope that there will be sufficient squirming in response. For some perspective:

“The capabilities of the United States’ allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.”

“…[F]or decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict — and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces engaged in these conflicts.”

and finally,

“We should look askance at idealistic, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to trascend the immutable principles and ugly realities of war, that imagine it is possible to cow, shock, or awe, an enemy into submission…”

There can be no doubt as to who and what Gates is referring, and it is a challenge long overdue. Yet, hope for progress and bureaucratic reform cannot be sufficient. Those who would have the resolve to see America’s leadership restored alongside its might should feel a mighty wind at their back.

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Flux and stasis

The desire for constructive social and foreign policy does not require rose-colored glasses, but is sustained by a simple recognition that the question comes before the answer. Such is my hope for the incoming administration, and it ought to be a considerable gauge of its success. Not all expectations will be met as the Bush years fade into painful memory, yet the wide-spread optimism following Obama’s victory has yet to be disappointed. For my own purposes, certain events of the past week have done well to undermine my political naivete, while others have altogether strengthened my conviction that rational idealism is not beyond grasp.

Senate Democrats determined that the best course of action leading into the next legislative session would be to allow Joe Lieberman to continue to wear the D badge he has pretended to wear over the last several years and which he used as a prop for bipartisanship during the downward spiral into bigotry of the McCain campaign. That was on Tuesday, and his initial attempts to play nice have been altogether unconvincing. Then, after conceding his electoral defeat on Wednesday, convicted felon Ted Stevens got a standing ovation on the Senate floor, including a singing-of-praises by Harry Reid. Seriously, are you kidding me?

Thankfully, the Democrats taking over the executive branch seem to have their act together. Last week, I focused on potential appointments at State and Defense, and news this week seems to confirm those observations. As the cabinet takes shape, the announcement of Clinton as the country’s top diplomat is all but made, Gates appears to be sticking around for a while, and now it looks like James Jones will be asked to serve as National Security Adviser. Jones’ hesitant relationship with politics and his NATO credentials are particularly worthy of mention, and combined with Joe Biden’s position in the administration (and the possibility that John Kerry will take over the chairmanship on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee), it seems safe to say that the American front office to the world is looking rather more qualified than it has of late.

So, while Congressional Democrats are sending the usual signs that they are, in fact, their own worst enemy, the Obama team continues to surprise with its absence of unpleasant surprises.

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The grown-up table

It’s been almost two weeks since the US election, and the gravitas associated with the transition of power ought to be a welcome sign of things to come. As the focus of the operation around the next president has shifted full-time to the daunting task of assuming executive duties from a failed administration, the gloating over a progressive victory after these eight years has been largely withheld. This is perhaps due to the depth of the historical moment, or the grinding down of the economy, or the wars into which the country has been forced, or the chilling savagery of the final laps of the campaign, but nevertheless the victors, particularly the inner circle of Obama’s new machine, have shown themselves remarkably reserved about their spoils. (If W. won a mandate last time, then “that one” is free to do whatever he damn well pleases this time…) Specifically, the threads that have been emerging about potential cabinet selections are an encouraging sign that the political pendulum, swung devastatingly far to the right during the Bush years, might be kept from swinging to an untenably left position. Prominent centrists on both sides of the party divide thus find themselves on the short lists. Though wary of too gross a generalization, the Bush administration represents failure in theory as much as in practice, in ideology as well as in execution. The lessons to be learned for the years to come must not ignore either side of the coin in favor of the other and to the detriment of all.

To be or not to be (partisan), that is the question. Obama’s first appointment of consequence was of Rahm Emanuel as Chief of Staff, an early sign that bipartisanship might not play such a role in the new White House after all. (Ironically, Emanuel’s many layered connections to Israel may make the next administration’s nuanced Middle East policies even less palatable to neo-conservatives. One can only hope…) In the cabinet, speculation remains over who will take over in Foggy Bottom and at the Pentagon, and considering the precarious state of American foreign relations I don’t find it too unreasonable to suggest that these appointments will be the most immediately consequential decisions in the first year of Obama’s presidency.

Hillary Clinton apparently leads the field of candidates to be the next Secretary of State, and although this must surely point to a great deal of political calculation (she is arguably the only viable Democratic contender left on the national stage) it is easy to imagine the reception that another Clinton would receive in the capitals of the world. Nevertheless, such an appointment might not exactly embody the “change” mantra in its fullest and could easily be construed as more cynical than it actually is. A better guarantor of the Clinton legacy can surely be found, and there’s no harm to be done in filling the job with a less familiar (or toxic) name, but at least Kissinger thinks that Clinton fits the bill.

The process towards the next Secretary of Defense is perhaps the most encouraging. The decision seems to be narrowed down to either retaining Robert Gates, praised for his sober realism since taking over at the Pentagon less than two years ago, or bringing on Richard Danzig, the highly regarded former Navy secretary. In either case, ongoing military transformation, debates between traditional and COIN-centric defense architectures, the (successful) end of major deployments in Iraq, and the refocusing of war efforts in Afghanistan will be overseen with the non-partisan gravity that the mission requires. Indeed, the notion of keeping Gates on board for an initial transition period before installing Danzig is highly appealing.

Though expectations on the new administration are unreasonably high (due in no small part, ironically, to the bold message of the Obama campaign), the early signs coming from Washington allow for plenty of optimism. The hard work remains to be done, but there has been yet no cause for alarm as the country prepares to emerge from the shadow of the past eight years.

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