This past weekend, the New York Times published a fascinating article about an issue that, like an onion, offers just about enough layers for everyone to get their share before coming apart in a mess of theory, law, power politics, and ethics. Apparently, an intricate American plan to wreak havoc on the Iraqi cyberstructure was eventually tabled because, in sum, the cascading consequences of such an attack could neither be fully anticipated nor hedged, and possible damages “at home” could not be discounted. It’s not a stretch to assume that staffs involved in the planning process were guided by “effects-based” standards of certainty quite impossible to satisfy in the physical, let alone in the digital, world. Such is the paradox of the networked society.
Two quotes, in particular, stand out from the article. First, we are warned of an apparent disconnect in the approaches to assessing the damages caused by hostile action:
“Policy makers are tremendously sensitive to collateral damage by virtual weapons, but not nearly sensitive enough to damage by kinetic” — conventional — “weapons,” said John Arquilla, an expert in military strategy at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. “The cyberwarriors are held back by extremely restrictive rules of engagement.”
And second, we must struggle with the dilemmas posed by the nation-state paradigm in (virtual) spaces where sovereignty is, to say the least, highly negotiable:
“Cyberwar is problematic from the point of view of the laws of war,” said Jack L. Goldsmith, a professor at Harvard Law School. “The U.N. Charter basically says that a nation cannot use force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any other nation. But what kinds of cyberattacks count as force is a hard question, because force is not clearly defined.”
Dodging these issue by embracing Willkür and asserting unilateral sovereignty of action (yes, states will do as they please) simply begs the question: why not stand to account? Indeed, while it may be that the hand of the botnets was staid by uncertainty in this instance, it also seems quite clear that the connectivity implied by this uncertainty is a precipice from which there is no turning back. There is ample reason to be concerned that our expectations of order are based on stacks of assumptions quite out of proportion to the stability these assumptions might afford when violently tested.
Coming to terms with problems that cannot be managed, predicted, or contained to any satisfactory degree will require an exercise in jargon: resilience.
Something I find fascinating in the discussion of Cyber war is the fact that, in this field, the United States is often not as clearly-dominant as we are in kinetic (to use the Times’ words) warfare. The trepidity defining this policy creates that much greater contrast with our conventional warfare doctrine.
I like the new theme btw, the light greens feel much calmer and welcoming than the black did, IMHO.
I’m not sure exactly how well this analogy fits, but strict kinetic conflict (What bloated terminology!) is, fundamentally, the ultimate zero-sum activity, while cyber seems to rest at the opposite end of the spectrum. The problems inherent in this realm seem to resemble complexities that continue to necessitate the counter-insurgency discipline, i.e. managing the space is as critical as “defeating” a specific threat.
And yeah, I was growing a bit weary of the dark theme…